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Message from the Editors
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on Irregular
Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary mission is
twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular Warfare into the
Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and second, to
bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share their
knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and non-violent
irregular challenges. This case study is part of an ongoing effort at
CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by world-renowned academics,
case studies, research papers, articles, and books.
This CIWAG case study on sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) is one
in a new series examining the role of economics in national/international
security and irregular warfare. In the globalized irregular warfare (IW)
world of the twenty-first century, understanding the operating
environment is paramount. In particular, it is vital to think about who
wields power and influence in that environment, not only inside a state but
also across state borders. Outside actors, such as private companies and
sovereign wealth funds, can bring tremendous pressure and influence on
the decisions of a government. This may in turn support and enhance, or
frustrate and undermine, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, or
counterinsurgency efforts. The key to understanding, anticipating, and
shaping these influences is a solid understanding of the strategic logic
behind those interests, including what a sovereign wealth fund does and
how they operate.
Sovereign wealth funds, as Mr. Krishnadas explains, are stateowned investment funds. They can help states “achieve economic growth,
finance public policy, and underpin sovereign security.” This case study
focuses on the Singaporean experience with SWFs and discusses its
unique history, the strategic logic behind creating a SWF, how it can be
used, and what a state can do with the income from SWFs. Mr.
Krishnadas, an international expert on the topic, sets out some of the
3
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terminology behind SWFs in order to open up this concept for nonspecialist readers and show the tremendous benefits that a well-managed
SWF can provide to their own state.
This holistic analysis of a single SWF example raises many
broader issues that IW practitioners need to be aware of: across the
globe—from the port of New Jersey to the copper mines in trans-Sahel
Africa—governments are wrestling with the issue of foreign financial
influence and national security. This becomes even more acute in states
that are trying to transition from conflict to stability: When should states
allow or encourage other countries to invest in them, and what industries
should they allow foreign companies to own or build? Should states allow
foreign investment funds to build infrastructure, extract rare minerals, and
operate ports? How does this support or undermine the legitimacy and
authority of that state? Successful IW practitioners need to understand and
be able to account for third-party influence in its many varieties in order to
be successful. The case study provides expert insight on a little-known but
increasingly prevalent source of influence that is of growing consequence
to IW efforts.
This case study is a place to begin the conversation about the
linkage between economics and security, particularly in regions in the
world where armed groups and irregular warfare are a daily reality.
Singapore is not alone in its utilization of SWFs to bolster its domestic
security and stability, and there is much more work to be done in
exploring this issue. As a starting point, for example, the appendices show
the distribution of the largest funds, including some of the newest—a $5
billion fund set up by Angola, and a $1 billion fund set up by Nigeria. In
addition, the bibliography gives a snapshot of China’s SWF strategy in the
U.S. and in conflict zones around the world. As we grapple with the role
of economics and financial influence on conflicts, this case study provides
a first look at the power that state-owned investment funds can wield at
home and abroad.
It is important to note two critical caveats to this case study. First,
4
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the opinions found herein are solely those of the author and do not
represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval War College,
or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to correct any
factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately responsible for the
content of this case study.
We hope you find it useful, and look forward to hearing your
feedback and suggestions for how you can contribute to the Center on
Irregular Warfare & Armed Group’s mission here at the Naval War
College.

5
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I. Introduction
Singapore is a tiny,1 affluent Southeast Asian city-state situated at
the southern tip of the Peninsula Malaysia. It is the world’s fourth-leading
global financial center2 and operates the world’s best airport,3 one of the
world’s top oil refineries,4 and one of busiest ports in the world—all while
providing a high standard of living for its people.5 Its Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) per capita income is the third highest in the world, ahead
of its former colonial master, the United Kingdom, as well as the United
States.6
A lesser known fact is that Singapore has been able to secure its
sovereignty with one of the world’s most technologically modern
militaries. With a population of just over 5 million,7 it is the fifth-largest
arms importer in the world, accounting for 4 percent of the world’s total
spending on arms imports,8 and its defense spending per head is in excess
of every country except the United States and Saudi Arabia.
What enables a small country to operate one of the most advanced
weaponry systems in the world, including the F-15SG Eagle, the F-16D
Block 52+ Fighting Falcon, and Formidable-class stealth frigates, and still
run budget surplus while practicing one of the lowest tax systems in the
world?
This paper will show that Singapore’s sovereignty has been
underpinned by the performance of its sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). It
1

270 square miles, or less than a quarter of the size of Rhode Island.
“The Global Financial Centres Index 13,” Long Finance, March 2013.
3
“The World’s Top 100 Airports,” World Airport Awards 2013, Skytrax,
http://www.worldairportawards.com/Awards_2013/top100.htm
4
Oil & Gas Journal
5
“2012 Quality of Living Worldwide City Rankings,” Mercer, 4 December 2012.
6
Gross domestic product based on purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita, World
Economic Database, April 2013, International Monetary Fund.
7
Population and Land Area, Singapore Department of Statistics, 2012.
8
“Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2012,” Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) Fact Sheet, March 2013.
2
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is the successful performance of these funds that have provided the
financial means for Singapore to defend itself without compromising its
domestic programs, to buttress its open economy from economic shocks,
and to augment its land-limited economic space with global investments.
As such, its sovereign wealth funds play the role of national strategy tools
that help to ensure national security and prosperity.
SWFs are state-owned investment funds. Since 2005, at least 30
SWFs have been created, and the assets managed by SWFs have grown,
buoyed in part by the rise in commodities prices, from over $3,000 billion
in 2007 to over $5,000 billion in 2013.9 Sovereign wealth funds can be
strategic instruments to achieve economic growth, finance public policy,
and underpin sovereign security. The paper will use Singapore as a case
study, as it has operated SWFs for over 40 years and has successfully
integrated their function into fiscal policy to drive a remarkable economic
transformation.

“Recent Sovereign Wealth Fund Market Size by Quarter,” Sovereign Wealth Fund
Institute, June 2013.
9
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II. Sovereign Wealth Funds
The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute defines a SWF as the
following:
a state-owned investment fund or entity that is commonly
established from balance of payments surpluses, official foreign
currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, governmental
transfer payments, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from
resource exports. The definition of sovereign wealth fund
exclude, among other things, foreign currency reserve assets held
by monetary authorities for the traditional balance of payments or
monetary policy purposes, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the
traditional sense, government-employee pension funds (funded
by employee/employer contributions), or assets managed for the
benefit of individuals.10
The concept of creating a savings fund or a stabilization fund on a
sovereign level only started to gain traction after World War II. In 1953,
Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, the ruler of Kuwait, decided to use
its oil revenue to create a fund called the Kuwait Investment Board11 for
the future and reduce its reliance on a single nonrenewable source.

“What Is a SWF?,” SWF Institute, http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund.
Interestingly, the first SWF has its origin back in the 19th-century United States. The
state of Texas created the Texas Special School Fund (now known as the Permanent
School Fund) in 1854 to assist in the funding of public education and easing the tax
burden of the state’s citizens. The initial funding of $2 million was part of a $10 million
payment from the U.S. government in exchange for relinquishing land claims on parts of
western lands (parts of the current states of New Mexico, Colorado, and Oklahoma) by
the former Republic of Texas. “The Handbook of Texas – Permanent School Fund,”
Texas State Historical Association, Retrieved from website on 17 July 2013,
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/khp01
11
Currently known as the Kuwait Investment Authority.
10
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Over the next couple of decades, more SWFs were established. To
date, 69 known funds have been established, spanning varied sovereign
origins and asset sizes. China (excluding Hong Kong) reigns at the top,
with US$1.2 trillion in assets with its four SWFs, followed by Abu Dhabi
and Norway at a distant second and third, respectively, with about US$0.7
trillion worth of assets each.
A powerful motivation to the formation of SWFs is the “Dutch
disease,”12 in which a resource boom eventually has a negative impact on
a country’s economy due an overreliance on resources, to the neglect of
the non-commodity export sector. Close to 70 percent of SWFs have
commodity-based origins and more look to be on the way. Speaking about
the recent approval by Israel’s cabinet to create a sovereign wealth fund
with revenue from natural gas discoveries, head of Israel’s National
Economic Council Eugene Kandel said, “The reason we are doing it now
is because we want to manage the expectations of various currency
markets, to show that we understand what ‘Dutch Disease’ is and [that] we
are going to take care of its consequences.”13
It should be highlighted that the economic effect of an influx of
foreign currency is not strictly confined to the space of natural resources
but rather includes “any development that results in a large inflow of
foreign currency, including a sharp surge in natural resource prices,
foreign assistance, and foreign direct investment.”14 Non-commoditybased countries that created SWFs for the purpose of savings for future
generations have well understood the importance of deferring immediate
gratification. Foremost amongst these countries is Singapore.

12

Coined by The Economist in 1977, when reporting on the discovery of a large natural
gas deposits in the North Sea back in 1959 and the subsequent decline of Netherlands’s
manufacturing sector.
13
“Israel Gas-Fund Law Shows ‘Dutch Disease’ Awareness, Kandel Says,” Alisa
Odenheimer and Calev Ben-David, Bloomberg News, 15 April 2013.
14
Christine Ebrahim-zadeh, “Back to Basics – Dutch Disease: Too Much Wealth
Managed Unwisely,” Finance and Development, Vol. 40, No 1, March 2003.
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III. The Singapore Security Challenge
Singapore is a tiny island nation situated at a geographically
strategic point where the Johor Straits leads into the pathways to the South
China Sea and the Indian Ocean. It is a secular country with a small but
cosmopolitan population. It is prosperous and meritocratic. It has rule of
law and civic order. Singapore is a close friend to Israel. It is a strategic
ally to both the United States, and increasingly to China. It has no natural
resources, yet is the most affluent country in Southeast Asia.
All of these things make it an exception in its neighborhood. It is
surrounded by much larger countries, Indonesia and Malaysia. All of its
fellow countries have large populations and are resource-rich. Malaysia,
its closest neighbor,15 practices a racially biased national policy that grants
preferential treatment to Malays. Both Indonesia and Malaysia are
predominantly Muslim. Both countries have antagonistic relationships
with Israel and historically rocky relationships with the United States. And
Singapore itself has a convoluted history with both its major neighbors
that has conditioned its approach to national security. To fully understand
this approach requires a brief familiarization with that colorful history.
The history of modern Singapore can be traced back to the early
19th century. Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, the lieutenant governor of
Bencoolen (now Bengkulu) in Sumatra, set out to look for a trading station
at the tip of the Malay Peninsula to protect the British merchant fleet along
the lucrative spice route and to forestall any potential advances by the
Dutch in the Indonesian Archipelago, then called the East Indies. Attracted
by the island’s natural deep harbor and strategic location, Raffles signed a
treaty with the Sultan of Johor in 1819 to establish Singapore as a trading
post of the East India Company. It subsequently became one of British
Straits Settlements in 1826.
15

Singapore and Malaysia are connected by a 0.6 mile bridge. At its narrowest, the straits
of Johor is only half a mile wide.
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The early years of peace and prosperity gave no hints to the
tumultuous years that would follow the British surrender of the settlement
to the Japanese in 1942. It was a rude awakening that Singapore, the
“Impregnable Fortress,” could fall to the Japanese in just seven days—a
debacle that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill described as “the
worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history.”
The end of the war did not long see the end of troubles. The
Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which had allied with the British to
fight the Japanese, now turned its attention to insurrection. It initiated a
terrorist campaign along the length of the Malayan peninsula. Singapore
was subject to bombings, assassinations, and riots. This period, which the
British referred to as the “Emergency,” was only brought under control
after a decade of brutal counterinsurgent warfare.16
Just as the tempo of the Emergency began to slow, Singapore faced
another existential threat—this time from Sukarno’s Indonesia. In 1959,
Singapore was granted limited self-government, and it formed a federation
with Malaya, Sarawak, and North Borneo in 1963, together becoming
Malaysia. President Sukarno, the volatile Indonesian leader, was opposed
to the formation of a federated Malaysia, however, and in 1962, he
launched a violent campaign called Konfrontasi, or “Confrontation,” to
disrupt and destabilize the nascent state.
During the Emergency, Singapore—still a colony without any
indigenous armed forces—was entirely reliant on the British for its
security needs. Even as part of the Federation, Singapore remained almost
totally dependent on the British to fight the Indonesian challenge. The
Konfrontasi was successfully brought to a close in 1966, but not before
some 37 bombs had been set off in Singapore and a pair of Indonesian
marines were caught, convicted, and subsequently hung for sabotage
16

The MCP would not surrender until 1989 in the wake of the fall of communism. Its
former leader, Chin Peng, resides today in a “peace village” in Southern Thailand.
Despite his repeated requests to return to Singapore to spend his last years, he continues
to be denied entry.
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activities by the government of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s tough-minded
prime minister.17
Ideological conflicts between the leaders of Singapore and Malaya
resulted in Singapore having to leave Malaysia in August 1965. These two
and a half decades of violence, civic unrest, and political volatility has had
a determinative effect on the thinking of Singapore leaders, both past and
present. Acutely conscious of the island’s vulnerability, Singapore’s
leadership committed to a strong national defense policy to protect the
sovereignty of the young nation. To finance such a defense, the country
had to do well economically and do so quickly.
In 1971, the financially weakened British withdrew its security
umbrella from Singapore. Henceforth, the island nation would have to go
it alone. It was economically crippled, financially weak, militarily
inadequate, surrounded by recent enemies, and geographically significant
in the middle of a Cold War. It would successfully overcome these
limitations and challenges and it would do so in part with the aid of a
“secret weapon”—its sovereign wealth funds.

17

The two marines were convicted on 20 October 1965, and hanged on 17 Oct 1968 after
their appeals were dismissed. Singapore Infopedia, National Library Board,
http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/ae11ffee-53fe-4486-95fd-ebc2a85abcc1.html and
http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_62_2004-12-17.html
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IV. An Economic Transformation
At the time of the withdrawal of their security umbrella, British
armed forces contributed over 20 percent to Singapore’s gross national
product, and the military bases provided employment to 1 in 10 people.18
Their departure thus left not just a security deficit but an economic one.
In building the young nation, the Singapore leaders with Lee Kuan
Yew at the helm began aggressive industrialization to develop the
country’s manufacturing and export sectors. These measures were helped
along by the rapid expansion of the world economy, which gave Singapore
an economic boom through the 1960s and 1970s.
It transitioned from a predominantly labor-intensive manufacturing
economy in the 1960s and 1970s to including capital-intensive and highvalue-adding industries in the 1980s, and subsequently to a skill- and
knowledge-based economy in the 1990s. In the process, Singapore’s GDP
grew from a modest US$704.5 million in 1960 to US$276.5 billion in
2012.
The process of industrialization and the aggressive bid to develop
the economy saw the Singapore government taking on stakes in various
local companies, start-ups, and joint ventures. These included a bank,
hotels, an iron and steel mill, an airline, and even the zoo and a bird park.
In order to allow the government to focus on its core role of policy making
and regulations, a move was made to establish a separate investment firm
to manage such assets commercially. Singapore’s economic success in its
early days also saw a rapid accumulation of foreign reserves, and the
government decided that its reserves would be better invested in longerterm and high-yielding assets. In 1981, this led to the formation of the
Government Investment Corporation.

“British Withdrawal from Singapore,” Singapore Infopedia, National Library Board
Singapore 2009, http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_1001_2009-02-10.html
18
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V. Singapore Sovereign Wealth Funds
The first SWF established by Singapore was Temasek Holdings,
which was set up in 1974 with an initial asset base of about US$150
million.19 It was initially comprised of various equity stakes formerly held
by the nation’s Ministry of Finance. Temasek takes mainly active equity
and often concentrates interest in identified firms of certain strategic
industries, mainly in Asia (including Singapore).
Six years later, the Government of Singapore Investment
Corporation (GIC) was launched. This SWF was tasked to manage
Singapore’s foreign reserves, with the aim of preserving and enhancing its
purchasing power. Its mandate is to achieve a good, sustainable real rate of
return over a 20-year time horizon. GIC adopts a highly diversified
approach towards its investment, with footprints in more than 45
exchange-traded and over-the-counter markets globally dealing with
stocks, futures and options, fixed income, natural resources, foreign
exchange, cash, and derivatives. While most of its investments are in the
public markets, it also has a smaller component in alternative investments
such as private equity and real estate.20
While Temasek and GIC are widely recognized as the two
“official” sovereign wealth funds of Singapore, the country’s central bank,
the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), has a similar function. One
of its functions is to manage the country’s official foreign reserves.21
19

Temasek Holdings had an initial portfolio valued at S$354 million, or about US$150
million after conversion.
20
“Our Business – Overview,” GIC, http://www.gic.com.sg/en/our-business/overview;
and “Investment Report by the Group Chief Investment Officer,” Report on the
Management of the Government’s Portfolio for the Year 2011/12, GIC Pte Ltd.
21
MAS’s functions are (1) to act as the central bank of Singapore, including the conduct
of monetary policy, the issuance of currency, the oversight of payment systems, and
serving as banker to and financial agent of the Government; (2) to conduct integrated
supervision of financial services and financial stability surveillance; (3) to manage the
official foreign reserves of Singapore; and (4) to develop Singapore as an international
financial center. Source: “Overview of MAS,” http://www.mas.gov.sg/
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While MAS is not technically a SWF, it does have some elements of one;
for instance, it appoints external fund managers to manage funds across a
range of investment mandates. As a central bank, MAS adopts a
conservative approach in its investment, with a significant proportion of
its portfolio invested in liquid financial market instruments.22
These three entities together form a portfolio model for the
investment of sovereign reserves. Temasek, with its active approach to
equities, takes the highest risk; GIC, with its focus on a highly diversified
approach, assumes the middle risk profile; and MAS, preferring to stay
mostly liquid, is the most conservative investor.

“Our Nation’s Reserves,” Government of Singapore, Ministry of Finance,
http://app.mof.gov.sg/index.aspx
22
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VI. The Security of Singapore
The security of Singapore is not merely a military consideration; it
is also a financial and economic one. As a young nation without a deep
history, and one that is contained on a small island, its viability as a
sovereign country is conditional on its economic success. This is what
permits it to “punch above its weight” in the international political,
financial, and economic arenas.
Surrounded by neighbors many times its size that were strikingly
different in terms of population makeup, religions, and languages, laden
with unpleasant memories from the days of confrontation with Indonesia
and its rancorous split with Malaysia, Singapore was determined to arm
itself to secure its sovereignty.
The island’s geographical limitation and limited population size
led to the Singapore Armed Forces’ decision to build needed capabilities
to fight swiftly and decisively in war. The stated mission of the Ministry
of Defence and the Singapore Armed Forces is “to enhance Singapore’s
peace and security through deterrence and diplomacy, and should these
fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor.”23 State-ofthe-art military equipment as well as systems and networks are constantly
being added to its arsenal through international arms purchases or are
developed on-shore by the government-affiliated defense contractor.
According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
between 2008-2012, Singapore was the fifth-largest arms importer in the
world and accounts for 4 percent of the world’s total spending on arms
imports.24
The nation’s defense spending has seen a steady increase over the
years, reaching US$10 billion in budgeted expenditure for FY2013. It is
“Mission,” MINDEF, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/mission.html
“The Main Importers and Exporters of Major Arms, 2008-2012,” in “International
Arms Transfers,” chap. 5, SIPRI Yearbook 2013, Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2013/05
23
24
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by far the largest single line item in the nation’s budget and accounts for
3.3 percent of GDP.25 In terms of military spending per capita, Singpore is
dwarfed only by the United States and Saudi Arabia.
Singapore today possesses the most technologically advanced
military in Southeast Asia.26 Weaponry includes platforms such as the
McDonnell Douglas F-15SG jet fighter, the F-16 Block 52+ Fighting
Falcon, modernized Leopard A4 main battle tanks, Swedish-built diesel
submarines, French-built frigates equipped with modern weapon systems
such as the AIM-120C Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, the
AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon, and the AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship
missile.
As well as ensuring it has the most up-to-date arms, Singapore
practices conscription. It requires every male citizen to spend two years in
compulsory military service, commencing at the age of 18. Upon
completion of this period of national service, men continue to serve in the
reserves for at least 10 years. Collectively, the active and reserve force
constitute some 200,000 men. These forces are well-equipped and
exercised regularly.
These forces are not only modern, they are also expensively
trained and deployed. Singapore has training arrangements with Australia,
India, Thailand, Taiwan, Brunei, and France. It regularly participates in
rigorous and complicated training exercises such as Red Flag in the United
States and Maple Flag in Canada, while itself hosting multilateral training
events by the participants in the Five Power Defence Arrangement.27

“Budget Highlights – Financial Year 2013,” Singapore Budget 2013, Singapore
Government, 25 February 2013, p. 19.
26
Jesse Vreeken, “Singapore’s Burgeoning Armed Forces, a Steadying Force,”
International Political Review, 2 February 2012,
http://www.theinternationalpoliticalreview.com/singapores-burgeoning-armed-forces-asteadying-force/
27
The Five Power Defence Arrangement is a mutual security pact between Singapore,
Malaysia, Australia, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand.
25
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Due to the limitations of its airspace, Singapore maintains overseas
training and operational conversion units for several of its frontline types.
These include a flying training school located at RAAF Base Pearce in
western Australia; a AS532 Cougar helicopter support squadron at Oakey
Army Aviation Centre in Queensland, Australia; a lead-in fighter training
squadron based in Cazaux, France; a F-16 operational conversion unit at
Luke Air Force Base in Arizona;28 an AH-64D Apache helicopter
operational conversion unit at Silverbell Army Heliport, also in Arizona;29
a F-15SG Eagle operational conversion unit at Mountain Home Air Force
Base in Idaho;30 and a CH-47D Chinook helicopter operational conversion
unit at Grand Prairie, Texas.31 These forces in effect also represent a
dispersal of air forces, theoretically permitting a second-strike capability
for home defense.
Singapore also constructed a purpose-built naval base that can
berth the largest aircraft carriers in the U.S. Navy. It is now a de facto
operating base for the U.S. Seventh Fleet. In 2012, the U.S. Navy
deployed its latest littoral combat ship, the USS Freedom (LCS-1), to
Singapore as part of a long-term commitment to forward deploy this
capability. These security arrangements with the United States are both
manifestations and anchors of the strategic partnership that Singapore
enjoys with the world’s reigning superpower. Such a relationship
augments its own capabilities to provide a continuing unassailable selfdefense position.
Despite heavy spending on defense, Singapore still enjoys a
healthy fiscal position, and the government’s coffers continue to grow. As
Table 2 in Annex A shows, the nation’s book has been mainly positive
over the years, save for a dip experienced in FY2009 in the aftermath of
the worldwide financial crisis.
28

Flying badged as 425th Fighter Squadron in the U.S. Air Force.
Flying badged as 1-285th Army Aviation Unit in the U.S. Army.
30
Flying badged as the 428th Fighter Squadron in the U.S. Air Force.
31
Flying badged as the 149th Aviation Unit in the U.S. Army.
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VII. National Strategy
Singapore has managed to keep its defense spending at such high
levels without compromising its fiscal soundness or resorting to punishing
taxation. Indeed, quite the reverse: In 2012, Singapore was ranked the best
country for doing business for the seventh year in a row.32 One of the
strategies adopted by the government is to maintain a competitive tax
environment for both companies and individuals. According to KPMG’s
Individual Income Tax and Social Security Rate Survey 2012, 33 Singapore
has one of the lowest personal income taxes in the world: the effective
income tax rate for someone earning $100,000 annually is less than 7
percent (Figure 7). Similarly, the corporate tax rate it levies is also among
the most competitive, at 17 percent (Figure 8). Its Goods and Services Tax
or Value-Added Tax, another important component of the tax system, is
also among the lowest at 7 percent (Figure 9).
That leaves the question: What is the balancing factor in the
equation? The answer: sovereign wealth funds. Examining the national
accounts, one might be intrigued by a special revenue line item labeled
“Net Investment Income (NII) / Net Investment Return (NIR)
Contribution.” This line item refers to financial returns generated by the
SWFs.
Under Article 142(1A)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of
Singapore, the government is able to use up to 50 percent of the net
investment return—the sum of: (1) the long-term expected real rate of
return on the reserves invested by GIC and MAS, and (2) the net

“Doing Business 2013 – Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises,”
World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, 23 Oct 2012,
http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2013
33
KPGM International, “KPMG’s Individual Income Tax and Social Security Rate
Survey 2012,” October 2012, www.kpmg.com.
32
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investment income on the remaining assets, comprising primarily
Temasek—to supplement its spending in the annual budget.34
The contribution of this item is nontrivial. Between FY2007 and
2012, it helped cover 7–17 percent of combined operating and
development expenditure (Figure 10). In fact, without the contributions by
the three stewards, the nation’s budget would have slipped into the red
zone starting in FY2008 (Table 3). Further, without NIR contributions, the
government would find it difficult to finance its social programs to share
the benefits of economic growth with residents, especially for those in the
lower income brackets.
Fully 75 percent of Singapore’s GDP is derived from exports,
leaving the country acutely sensitive to global macroeconomic events. The
global financial crisis of 2008–2009 threatened to undermine the health of
the entire world’s economy. Singapore, as both a financial center and a
small, open-export-oriented economy, quickly registered negative effects.
However, during the peak of the crisis in late 2008 when the lending
market froze and Lehman Brothers failed, the Singapore government
announced that it would guarantee all Singapore dollar and foreign
currency deposits of individual and non-bank customers in licensed banks,
finance companies, and merchant banks. This was backed by US$120
billion in reserves.35 Signs of economic slowdown were still apparent,
with the economy contracting 10 percent in the first quarter of FY2009
alone. In light of the severe strain on the economy, the government also
introduced a US$12 billion “resilience package” as a countermeasure. Key
points included a jobs credit program to assist businesses with wages and a
special risk-sharing initiative aimed at stimulating bank lending. The
availability of the reserves allowed the government to take prompt and
decisive action in a time of extreme crisis. This was not the first time that
reserves had come in handy. One reason that Singapore was able to
34

Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, http://app.agc.gov.sg/.
Joint Press Statement by Singapore’s Ministry of Finance and Monetary Authority of
Singapore, 16 October 2008.
35
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weather the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 better than its neighbors
was the existence of its significant reserves. This deterred the kind of
speculative attacks on its currency that bedeviled its neighbors in ASEAN,
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, including Thailand and
Malaysia.36
Singapore’s financial and economic strength is enhanced by the
agency of its sovereign wealth funds. The investments made through them
permit Singapore to extend its economic footprint beyond its limited land
space. In doing so, it not only increases its financial and economic
performance but also uses the SWF investments as a hedge against
asynchronous performance at regional or sectoral levels. This helps to
dampen the sensitivity of such an open economy to macroeconomic events
such as the Asian and global financial crises.
Singapore’s political, economic, and financial performance has
also underwritten its participation in leading international forums.
Singapore was one of the key participants that helped developed the
Santiago Principles, a set of voluntary principles and practices governing
SWFs. In 2011, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for
Finance Tharman Shanmugaratnam was appointed the first Asian chair of
the International Monetary and Financial Committee. Singapore has
enjoyed observer status in the G-20 for several years. It continues to play a
leading role in ASEAN and in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. It
has also had the distinction of serving a term as president of the Security
Council of the United Nations. In 2012, Singapore, unusually for an
equatorial country, was granted permanent observer status in the Arctic
Council.
While physically a small nation, Singapore is treated as a
heavyweight by the international community. This reflects the nation’s
Maria Delfina Alcaide Garrido, “Government and External Risk Mitigation: Why Was
Singapore Less Affected by the Asian Financial Crisis than its Southeast Asian
Neighbours?” Working Paper Series, No. 05-54, Development Studies Institute, London
School of Economic and Political Science, Feb 2005.
36
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systemic approach to national strategy. It takes a multidimensional
model—political, economic, financial, and military—with each dimension
having reinforcing consequences on all others. Singapore has used its
SWFs strategically to make up for its natural limitations in size and
population, to complement its economic and financial performance, to
supplement its fiscal policy needs, and by extension to permit the nation to
afford a technologically superior military and forge politically strong ties
with strategic allies.
Many lessons about the operation of SWFs are to be drawn from
the Singapore experience, especially the need to clearly orient SWFs
toward serving national interests, the advantages of taking a long-term
approach to investing, and the benefits of adopting a portfolio of risk
management. Ultimately, however, SWFs can be no more than tools of
national strategy. The strategy itself and the national interests they serve
remain the preserve and the responsibility of political leadership. Only a
confident, responsible, and competent political leadership can adequately
define national interests and have the discipline to steward national
resources in their service.
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Figure 1: Top 10 Sovereign Wealth Funds (in US$ Billion)37

China
UAE - Abu Dhabi
Norway
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Kuwait
China - Hong Kong
Russia
Qatar
Australia
0

37

200

400

600

Source: SWF Institute, July 2013

27

800

1000

1200

1400

KRISHNADAS
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AS TOOLS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

Figure 2: Distribution of Sovereign Wealth Fund Assets38
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Source: SWF Institute
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Figure 3: Sovereign Wealth Funds by Funding Source and
Region39
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Source: SWF Institute
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Based on data updated July 2013:
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Figure 4: Stewards of Singapore’s Reserves40

Source: Ministry of Finance (Our Nation’s Reserves), Temasek Holdings, and
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Pte Ltd websites
40
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Figure 5: Expenditure by the Government of Singapore for
FY2013 (by Sector)41

“Budget Highlights: Financial Year 2013,” Singapore Budget 2013, Singapore
Government, 25 February 2013, p. 18.
41
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Figure 6: Military Expenditure Per Capita by Country, 2012, in
US$42
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Figure 7: Effective Income Tax and Social Security Rates on
US$100,000 of Gross Income43

“KPMG’s Individual Income Tax and Social Security Rate Survey 2012,” KPMG
International, www.kpmg.com.
43
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Figure 8: Corporate Tax Rates of Selected Countries 201344
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Figure 9: Indirect Tax Rates of Selected Countries, 201345

* VAT or GST has been proposed but the implementation has been postponed. In its
place, Malaysia has sales tax and service tax. Sales tax is imposed on taxable goods
manufactured locally/imported, unless exempted. The standard rate of sales tax is 10
percent…. Service tax is charged on specific types of services (taxable services)
provided by taxable persons. The rate of service tax is 6 percent.46
^ While the U.S. does not impose a national VAT, most states, and some local
governments impose transactional based taxes commonly referred to as sales and use
taxes. … The state and local tax sales tax rate in the US may range from 4 percent to 11
percent.47

45

Indirect Tax Rates Table, KPMG International, 2013,
http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/pages/indirect-tax-ratestable.aspx
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
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Figure 10: Percentage of Net Investment Returns Contribution (NIRC)
Over Total Expenditure (Excludes Special Transfers)48
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Table 1: The 5 Largest Importers of Major Conventional Weapons and
Their Major Suppliers, 2008-201249

Source: “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2012,” Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) Fact Sheet, March 2013.
49
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Table 2: Singapore’s Overall Fiscal Position for FY2007 to FY2013 ($
million)44

Operating Revenue

FY2007

FY2008

FY2009

FY2010

FY2011

32,300

32,869

31,638

36,848

40,862

Tax Revenue

29,304

30,167

29,294

33,478

36,861

Fees and Charges

2,904

2,570

2,212

3,189

3,759

92

132

132

181

242

26,386

30,473

33,513

36,270

37,250

20,762

22,987

24,727

26,616

28,120

5,624

7,486

8,786

9,654

9,130

Primary Surplus / Deficit

5,914

2,397

-1,875

578

3,611

Special Transfers 2

1,714

5,679

4,385

5,676

6,742

1,074

3,271

3,257

1,204

2,327

4,841

-874

-5,133

-626

1,284

640

2,408

1,128

4,472

4,414

Net Investment Income (NII) / Net Investment Return (NIR) Contribution 4

1,924

3,474

5,605

5,882

6,333

Overall Budget Surplus / Deficit

6,125

191

-655

784

3,202

Others
Total Expenditure
Operating Expenditure
Development Expenditure

1

Special Transfers Excluding Top-ups to Endowment and Trust Funds
Basic Surplus / Deficit 3
Top-ups to Endownment and Trust Funds
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Table 2, cont’d.
Note: Figures have been converted to USD using the exchange rate US$1 =
S$1.25.

Operating Revenue

FY2007

FY2008

FY2009

FY2010

FY2011

FY20

14.8%

15.6%

14.0%

14.5%

15.5%

16.1

Tax Revenue

13.4%

14.3%

13.0%

13.2%

14.0%

14.4

Fees and Charges

1.3%

1.2%

1.0%

1.3%

1.4%

1.6%

Others

0.0%

0.1%

0.1%

0.1%

0.1%

0.1%

Total Expenditure

12.1%

14.5%

14.9%

14.3%

14.1%

14.6

Operating Expenditure

9.5%

10.9%

11.0%

10.5%

10.7%

10.8

Development Expenditure 1

2.6%

3.6%

3.9%

3.8%

3.5%

3.8%

Primary Surplus / Deficit

2.7%

1.1%

-0.8%

0.2%

1.4%

1.5%

Special Transfers 2

0.8%

2.7%

1.9%

2.2%

2.6%

2.6%

0.5%

1.6%

1.4%

0.5%

0.9%

0.4%

2.2%

-0.4%

-2.3%

-0.2%

0.5%

1.1%

0.3%

1.1%

0.5%

1.8%

1.7%

2.2%

4
Net Investment Income (NII) / Net Investment Return (NIR) Contribution

0.9%

1.6%

2.5%

2.3%

2.4%

2.2%

Overall Budget Surplus / Deficit

2.8%

0.1%

-0.3%

0.3%

1.2%

1.1%

Special Transfers Excluding Top-ups to Endowment and Trust Funds

3
Basic Surplus / Deficit
Top-ups to Endownment and Trust Funds

1

Development Expenditure excludes land-related expenditure.
Special Transfers include Top-ups to Endowment and Trust Funds.
3
Surplus/Deficit before Top-ups to Endowment and Trust Funds and Net
Investment Income/Returns Contribution.
4
Prior to FY2009, up to 50 percent of Net Investment Income (NII) could be
taken into the annual budget for spending. In effect from FY2009, under the Net
2
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Investment Returns (NIR) framework, up to 50 percent of the expected longterm real rate of returns on the relevant assets specified in the constitution can
be taken in for spending. For the other assets, up to 50 percent of the net
investment income can continue to be used for spending in the annual budget.

Source: “Budget Highlights, Financial Year 2013,” Singapore Government, 25 February
2013.
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Table 3: Singapore’s Overall Fiscal Position for FY2007 to FY2013 ($
million) (Items Rearranged)

FY2007

FY2008

FY2009

FY2010

FY2011

FY2012

FY2013
(Budgeted)

Operating Revenue

32,300

32,869

31,638

36,848

40,862

44,142

44,022

Less: Total Expenditure

26,386

30,473

33,513

36,270

37,250

40,084

42,728

Primary Surplus / Deficit

5,914

2,397

-1,875

578

3,611

4,058

1,294

Less: Special Transfers

1,714

5,679

4,385

5,676

6,742

7,094

5,517

Overall Budget Surplus / Deficit (before NII/ NIR Contribution)

4,201

-3,282

-6,260

-5,098

-3,130

-3,035

-4,222

Net Investment Income (NII) / Net Investment Return (NIR) Contribution

1,924

3,474

5,605

5,882

6,333

6,122

6,162

Overall Budget Surplus / Deficit

6,125

191

-655

784

3,202

3,086

1,940
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some balance between the two be found that will be both stable and acceptable
to all concerned?
Baghat, Gawdat. “Sovereign Wealth Funds: Dangers and Opportunities.”
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 84,
No. 6 (Nov. 2008), pp. 1189-1204.
Abstract: Soaring oil prices since the early 2000s have led to a historic
transformation of wealth from consuming regions to major oil exporters. In
recent years many of these exporters have set up oil funds to utilize their
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